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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOHN QUAS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890601-CA
Priority No. 2

:
INTRODUCTION

On August 27, 1991, this Court ordered the parties to
submit supplemental briefs discussing the following issue:
Whether any error in allowing the information to
be refiled was merely harmless error where the
magistrate subsequently found probable cause to
bindover. and where defendant was later convicted
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(emphasis added)•
It must first be noted that the error involved in this case
extends from the improper refiling of the information, to the
magistrate's finding of probable cause, because that finding
involved the magistrate's failure to apply the Brickey due process
standards in entering the bindover order following the successive
preliminary hearing.

See opening brief of Appellant at 10 through

27; reply brief of Appellant at 5 through 9; petition for rehearing
at 5.
It is Mr. Quas' position that if any harmless error
analysis applies, it must be limited to the effect of the conviction
in the trial court, and should not encompass the effect of the

magistrate's probable cause finding, because the magistrate's
probable cause finding is part of the error.
The issue posed by the Court is a question of Utah State
Constitutional law, a matter of first impression, requiring this
Court to make original legal findings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The standards for refiling informations set forth in State
v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), are guaranteed by Article I
section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

It has yet to be determined

whether harmless error analysis applies to Brickey violations of
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and if so, what that
analysis should be.
The plain language of Article I section 7, and various
other State Constitutional provisions precludes the harmless error
analysis under consideration by this Court.1
Assuming arguendo that some form of harmless error analysis
could allow the State to deprive a person of liberty without due

1. Counsel for Mr. Quas is aware that this Court desires
extensive analysis of state constitutional issues. E.g. State v.
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-1273 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Due to the
time constraints imposed, counsel for Mr. Quas limits the analysis
primarily to the plain language of the Utah Constitution.
Counsel for Mr. Quas maintains, however, that reliance on
the plain language of the Utah Constitution is proper, and comports
with the State Constitutional mandate of separation of government
powers. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, section 46.03
(explaining how courts maintain the integrity of judicial and
legislative functions by following the plain language of laws);
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (separation of powers
provision).
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process of law under the Utah Constitution, no such analysis could
compensate for the illegal refiling of the information and bindover
order in this case.
In Utah, district court jurisdiction in criminal cases is
contingent on the legality of the bindover order from the magistrate
presiding over the preliminary hearing.

In this case, the

magistrate's bindover order was illegal because it violated the due
process requirements set forth in State v. Brickey, supra.

The

illegal bindover order failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court, and the jury's verdict is a nullity.
In the absence of the illegal refiling and bindover order,
the result in this case would have been different.

Had the

magistrate applied the Utah due process standards set forth in State
v. Brickey. there would have been no bindover order, no trial and no
conviction in this case unless and until the State met the Brickey
standards.
On appeal, Mr. Quas has challenged all material evidence of
his guilt.

If this Court were to address all issues raised on the

merits, the conviction would not stand to compensate for the due
process violation.

ARGUMENT
I.
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
DOES NOT APPLY TO BRICKEY VIOLATIONS OF
ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
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The refiling of the information and bindover order violated
the standards set forth in State v, Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986).

See opening brief of Appellant at 10-27 and reply brief of

Appellant at 5-9.

Brickey is explicitly decided under Article I

section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

714 P.2d at 646.

The Utah Constitution has no harmless error provision, and
in fact, contains a provision requiring absolute fidelity to each
constitutional provision.

Article I section 26 of the Utah

Constitution provides,
The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise.
The plain language of this provision requires a literal
reading of Article I section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991), the Utah Supreme Court recently interpreted Article I
section 7 with Article I section 11 (the open courts provision),2

2. The open courts provision supports Mr. Quas' position,
discussed infra, that application of a harmless error analysis to
the illegal refiling of the information in this case would violate
his constitutional rights to relief from the due process violation.
Article I section 11 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
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emphasizing the absolute nature of the right to due process in
Utah.

The court stated,
[T]he mandate of the due process clause of
article I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights
in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive in its
application to all activities of state
government. It is the province of the judiciary
to assure that a claim of the denial of due
process by an arm of government be heard and, if
justified, that it be vindicated.

Id. at 735.
The Utah jurisdictional framework of appeals of bindover
orders counsels against the application of harmless error analysis
based on convictions subsequent to the bindover orders.
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides all
criminal defendants with "the right to appeal in all cases."
Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides further,
"Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."
In State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App.), cert,
granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), this Court characterized the
magistrate's preliminary hearing as an exercise of original
jurisdiction, and review of the magistrate's bindover order as an
appeal.

See 794 P.2d at 497-498.

This Court ruled that

jurisdiction over these appeals is to be found in the interlocutory
appeals jurisdiction of this Court.

Id.

at 500.

In the event that this Court denies a petition for
interlocutory appeal in an improper refiling case, and that case
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goes to trial and results in a conviction, application of harmless
error analysis would strip that defendant of a meaningful appeal of
the improper bindover order.
The Humphrey court implicitly recognized that because there
are constitutional rights to appeal bindover orders, a conviction
subsequent to an improper bindover order has no harmless error
effect.

Footnote 8 of Humphrey states,
Defendants correctly claim that because the
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is
discretionary, defendants might be forced to go
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is
denied.

Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
Preliminary hearings are uniquely important in this State.
See e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13 (preliminary
hearing provision); State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1988)(discussing historical importance of preliminary hearings in
Utah).

Every person in this State is entitled to a preliminary

hearing that comports with due process of law, and to a legal remedy
if that due process is not afforded.

See e.g. Article I section 13

(right to preliminary hearing); Article I section 7 (right to due
process of law); Article I section 11 (right to open courts);
Article I section 12 (right to appeal in all cases); Article VIII
section 5 (right to appeal from original to appellate jurisdiction);
Article I section 26 (constitution is mandatory and prohibitory);
Article I section 2 (the authority of free governments is founded on
the right of all people to equal protection and benefit of the
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government); Article I section 24 (requiring uniform operation of
laws); Article VI section 26 (prohibiting private laws).
It appears that harmless error analysis may be applied to
some violations of the Utah Constitution.

See State v. Anderson,

612 P.2d 778, 786-787 (Utah 1980)(court applied harmless error
analysis to violation of confrontation right at preliminary
hearing).

Given the unique Utah Constitutional framework governing

the refiling of informations and bindover analysis in cases
involving successive preliminary hearings, discussed supra, this
Court should not apply harmless error analysis in this case.
Further, it is not clear that harmless error analysis would
apply under the Federal Constitution.

See State v. Brickev, 714

P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986)(Brickey is decided under State
Constitution because federal law is unsettled); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 and n.8 (1967)(while some federal
constitutional errors may never constitute harmless error, others
may be considered harmless error if they are harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)(Court
members differ concerning how to apply harmless error analysis to
error of denial of counsel at preliminary hearing when defendant was
subsequently convicted).

II.
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
WOULD NOT COMPENSATE FOR
THE ILLEGAL REFILING OF THE INFORMATION
AND BINDOVER ORDER IN THIS CASE.
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In the event that this Court determines that some harmless
error analysis does apply, that analysis should be at least as
stringent as the federal standard of harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

See Brickey, Chapman. and Coleman, supra.
The analysis which follows demonstrates that under varying

standards of harmless error, the improper filing of the information
and subsequent improper bindover order do not constitute harmless
error.

A. THE ILLEGAL BINDOVER ORDER FAILED TO INVOKE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
JURISDICTION; THE CONVICTION IS A NULLITY.
Longstanding Utah case law establishes that the
jurisdiction of the district court over a criminal case is
contingent on the propriety of the preliminary hearing and bindover
order.

In State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937), the court

explained,
The right of the district court to try any one
for a felony rests upon the filing in such court
of a proper indictment by grand jury, or the
filing of a proper information by the district
attorney, or other proper counsel for the state.
R.S.Utah 1933, 105-17-1. And such information
can be filed properly, only after the accused has
been duly bound over and held to answer in the
district court by a magistrate having
jurisdiction to investigate the charge and
determine if there is probable cause to believe
an offense has been committed and that defendant
is guilty thereof. Constitution of Utah, art. I,
§ 13; ... And before the defendant can be so
bound over and held to answer by the magistrate,
he is entitled to a preliminary hearing, unless,
with the consent of the State, he waives such
hearing[.]
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Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
In State v. Tweed, 224 P. 443 (Utah 1924), the court
emphasized that the district court may not proceed to trial if the
defendant is not given the preliminary hearing to which he is
constitutionally entitled.

The court stated,

Under our Constitution (article I §13), any
one charged with a felony may be prosecuted
either upon an indictment found by a grand jury
or upon an information filed by the prosecuting
attorney. In case the prosecution is based upon
an information filed by the prosecuting attorney
the accused is, however, entitled to a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate before
the information is lodged against him in the
district court and, if it be made to appear to
the district court before a plea on the merits is
entered in that court that the accused had not
been given a preliminary hearing, and that he had
not waived such a hearing, the information may be
quashed on motion of the accused and he cannot be
legally tried in the district court until he has
either been given the preliminary hearing
provided for in the Constitution, or it be made
to appear that he has waived such a hearing.
Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
Inasmuch as Brickey sets constitutional standards for
preliminary hearings, if those standards are not met, the district
court has no jurisdiction to try the defendant.

See id.

See also

State v. Easthope. 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983)("[T]he district
court, although having jurisdiction over the offense, §78-3-4, does
not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant himself until he is
bound over by the magistrate.

State v. Freeman. 93 Utah 125,

133-34, 71 P.2d 196, 200 (1937); State v. Truiillo. 117 Utah 237,
243-45, 214 P.2d 626, 630-31 (1950).M).

In cases where the district

court proceeds to trial without jurisdiction, the conviction is a

- 9

-

nullity, and cannot compensate for the illegal bindover order*

See

Id.

B. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ILLEGAL REFILING OF THE INFORMATION AND
BINDOVER ORDER, THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.
Under Chapman analysis, the illegal refiling of the
information and bindover order were not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, for the trial and conviction of Mr. Quas resulted from the
refiling and bindover order.

If the magistrate had followed the due

process standards, there would have been no bindover order, no
trial, and no conviction, unless and until the State met the Brickev
standards.
Application of the harmless error analysis traditionally
applied to non-constitutional error leads to the conclusion that
harmless error analysis does not compensate for the Brickey
violation in this case.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a)

provides in part, "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded."

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as

follows:
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, an error
requires reversal only if we conclude that absent
the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
result more favorable to the accused.
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1989).
In the absence of the due process violations, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a different result.

Mr. Quas would not

have been bound over, tried or convicted, unless and until the
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prosecution met the Brickey due process standards.

The lack of

trial and conviction are certainly "a result more favorable" to Mr.
Quas than was the homicide conviction.
This Court should not analyze this case under an
evidentiary harmless error standard, because the error in this case
was not an evidentiary error, but a procedural constitutional
error.

Other Utah cases analyzing the effect of procedural errors

involving the preliminary hearing do not attempt to compensate for
errors by analyzing the weight of evidence presented at trial.
In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the court
assumed the correctness of the defendant's complaint that the arrest
warrant was illegal, but concluded that such a defect was
immaterial.

The court noted that the only prejudice was

insignificant pretrial delay, and that the full panoply of rights
was extended to the defendant at trial.

Id. at 270-272.

In

contrast, the court resolved all issues relating to errors at the
preliminary hearing on the merits, and did not rely on the fact that
the defendant had been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to
diminish the significance of the potential preliminary hearing
errors.

This was so despite the fact that the defendant apparently

did not attempt to obtain an interlocutory review of the bindover
order.

Id. at 266-270.
In State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988), the court

reversed a conviction for sexual abuse of a child because the charge
encompassing the episode apparently proved beyond a reasonable doubt
at trial was dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary
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hearing.

It appears from the court's footnote 2 at page 1139 that

the magistrate's dismissal was improper, but that the State had
failed to appeal the order.
In State v. Poteet. 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984), the defendant
was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the bail jumping and
aggravated assault charges. Id. at 762.

In disposing of his

complaint that one of the preliminary hearings was delayed, the
court indicated that the delay did not cause him undue pretrial
incarceration because he was incarcerated on other charges while
awaiting the belated preliminary hearing, and found no prejudice
stemming from the violation of a rule of criminal procedure.
764-765.

Id. at

The court did not discuss the lack of prejudice stemming

from the procedural preliminary hearing error by focusing on the
defendant's convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Lairbv. 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), overruled on
other grounds in State v* Ossanna, 739 P.2d 628, 631 n.8 (Utah
1987), the defendants complained that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that the magistrate
erred in admitting affidavits into evidence, and that the
prosecution suppressed mitigating evidence at the preliminary
hearing.

Id. 1193.

The court rejected these claims because there

was no official transcript of the preliminary hearing in the record,
and noted in passing that the unofficial transcript reflected
sufficient evidence to bind the case over.

Id. at 1192 and n.l.

The court dismissed the claim that one defendant's preliminary
hearing was delayed by noting that the claim was waived and that the

- 12 -

defendant had failed to show prejudice.

Id. at 1196. While the

court did find that there was sufficient evidence to support the
convictions, id. at 1208, the convictions were not used by the court
as a basis for finding any errors alleged about the preliminary
hearing harmless.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in State v.
Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), the Court applied harmless error
analysis to the violation of the defendants' constitutional right to
confrontation in the preliminary hearing.

In applying this harmless

error analysis, the court assessed the impact of the error within
the context of the preliminary hearing, and did not rely on evidence
presented at trial resulting in criminal convictions.

Id.

at

786-787.
In the event that this Court applies an evidence-based
harmless error analysis to the procedural constitutional error in
this case, it is Mr. Quas' position that the improper refiling of
the information and bindover order are not harmless error.
Virtually all evidence of guilt is challenged in Mr. Quas' opening
and reply briefs.

If this Court were to address each issue raised

on the merits, the conviction of Mr. Quas would not stand to
compensate for the due process violations occurring at the
preliminary hearing.
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CONCLUSION
The improper refiling of the information and bindover order
in this case do not constitute harmless error.

Respectfully submitted this

4-

day of October, 1991.

LISA JVREMAL
Attorney for Mr. Quas

CANDICE A. JOHNSON
Attorney foriMr. Quas

HoiBROOK
Attorney for Wr. Quas
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